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RICO Reform: How Much Is
Needed?
Remarks of Congressman William J. Hughes*
Chair, Subcommittee on Crime, Committee on the Judiciary
United States House of Representatives
November 10, 1989
I. INTRODUCTION
My letter of invitation to this Symposium urged me to prepare a
"State of the Union" on legislative reform of RICO. This invitation
comes at a time when I have spent the last nine months listening to
various experts tell me what should or should not be done with RICO.
I, therefore, welcome this opportunity to express my personal thoughts.
RICO reform has been one of the most time-consuming and diffi-
cult issues in the 101st Congress. The House Subcommittee on Crime
has held three full-day hearings on RICO reform, listening to testimony
from a vast array of witnesses on both sides of the reform issue, and
several in the middle. From a personal perspective, hardly a day has
passed in the last nine months that I have not had a meeting, a discus-
sion with a House colleague, or a staff session on the subject of RICO
reform.
At the outset I should mention that I do not have a magic "silver
bullet" for this extremely complicated statute and the numerous con-
troversies it has engendered. RICO contains more than forty federal
felonies as predicate offenses, and nine generic state statutes. The large
number of predicate offenses, combined with such nebulous terms as
"enterprise," and "pattern of racketeering activity," leaves many ob-
servers wondering whether RICO eventually will sustain a constitu-
tional attack. Indeed, Justice Antonin Scalia virtually asked for such a
challenge in his recent concurring opinion in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern
Bell Telephone Co., when he stated:
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No constitutional challenge to this law has been raised in the present case, and so
that issue is not before us. That the highest Court in the land has been unable to
derive from this statute anything more than today's meager guidance bodes ill for
the day when that challenge is presented.1
Combined with this invitation, there is a long list of prominent or-
ganizations that have petitioned Congress to amend civil RICO. They
include: The American Bar Association, National Association of Manu-
facturers, American Civil Liberties Union, United States Chamber of
Commerce, AFL-CIO, American Institute of Certified Public Account-
ants, Securities Industry Association, American Bankers Association,
Independent Bankers Association of America, Future Industries Associ-
ation, American Council of Life Insurance, Credit Union National Asso-
ciation, Grocery Manufacturers of America, National Automobile
Dealers Association, State Farm Insurance Companies, Alliance of
American Insurers, and The American Financial Services As'sociation.
At the same time, there is impressive opposition to drastic change in
civil RICO. This opposition includes such organizations as: The Public
Citizen-Congress Watch, The United States Public Interest Research
Group, National Association of Attorneys' General, National District
Attorneys Association, National Association of Insurance Commission-
ers, and The North American Securities Administration Association.
Even these organizations, however, concede that some changes may be
appropriate.
During my presentation I will outline my views of RICO; offer some
specific comments on the mail and wire fraud predicates and the role
they play in the problems experienced with RICO, on both the criminal
and civil sides; make some general observations about the statute; and
comment on the status of the reform efforts before Congress. At the end
of my presentation I will outline my thoughts on resolving some of the
existing problems, as well as my commitment to pursue answers to fu-
ture problems.
II. VIEWS ON RICO
Congress created the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (RICO)2 in 1970. According to its statement of findings and
purposes,3 Congress intended RICO as a means to eradicate organized
crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evi-
dence-gathering process, establishing new penal prohibitions, and pro-
1. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2909 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
2. Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 941, 941 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§
1961-1968 (1988)) [hereinafter RICO].
3. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 922-23.
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viding enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful
activities of those engaged in organized crime. In the words of the
United States Supreme Court, RICO "takes aim at 'racketeering activ-
ity' ", and encompasses acts that are either "chargeable" under nine
generic state laws or "indictable" under numerous federal criminal pro-
visions. 5 There is a constant flow of proposals coming to Congress to
increase the number of predicate acts, the latest being the bank fraud
act,' which was added to the list of predicate offenses in 1989 as part of
the savings and loan bill.7 Even House Bill 1046,8 the Boucher bill, that
is the RICO reform proposal supported by a wide coalition of interest
groups who want to substantially narrow civil RICO, would add some
twenty-five new RICO predicates.
Increasing the number of predicate offenses under RICO makes ab-
solutely no sense. The problems with civil RICO stem largely from the
breadth and vagueness of criminal RICO. Even the Supreme Court is
sending signals that if Congress does not rein RICO in, the Court will.'
In my judgment, this is not the time to add twenty-five new predicates.
Increasing the number of predicates will only aggravate the problems of
reach and vagueness that are inherent in the statute. To make matters
worse, some of the proposed new predicate offenses are even misde-
meanors, which do not belong in a statute that targets major organized
crime.'0
I understand that the Department of Justice says they are not wor-
ried about turmoil in the lower courts and rumblings in the Supreme
Court about the breadth, vagueness, and even the very constitutionality
of the RICO statute. Don't believe it. They are very worried. That is
why the Department of Justice has issued the new guidelines on tempo-
rary restraining orders and the use of RICO in tax cases." That is also
why, when the Senate added nine new predicates in the savings and
loan bailout bill, the Justice Department supported only two, and said
that in a choice between nine and none, they preferred none.
4. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 481 (1985).
5. See generally RICO, supra note 2, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988).
7. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-
73, 103 Stat. 183.
8. H.R. 1046, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
9. See, e.g., H.J. Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2893.
10. For example, the Boucher bill would add 18 U.S.C. § 1501 (1988), a misdemeanor that
prohibits obstructing or assaulting a federal process server. See H.R. 1046, supra note 8, § 9.
11. See infra notes 18 & 19 and accompanying text.
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III. MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD
The keys to RICO litigation, in both the criminal and civil areas,
are the mail12 and wire fraud statutes. The popularity of the mail
fraud statute was described most vividly in an article by Jed Rakoff.
Rakoff wrote:
To federal prosecutors of white collar crime, the mail fraud statute is our Stradiva-
rius, our Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart-and our true love. We may
flirt with RICO, show off with 10b-5, and call the conspiracy law "darling," but we
always come home to the virtues of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, with its simplicity, adaptabil-
ity ard comfortable familiarity. 4
That popularity, shared by private litigants as well as prosecutors, also
extends to the wire fraud statute. The mail and wire fraud statutes can
be used to reach almost all fraudulent activity. This "adaptability" has
caused much of the problem in both criminal and civil RICO. For ex-
ample, Justice Byron White's opinion in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.
noted: "The 'extraordinary' uses to which civil RICO has been put ap-
pear to be primarily the result of the breadth of the predicate offenses,
in particular the inclusion of wire, mail, and securities fraud ... .
There is, however, little or no support in Congress to delete mail
and wire fraud laws from RICO. One of the main reasons for this lack
of support is the adamant opposition to any such change by the Depart-
ment of Justice because mail and wire fraud predicates predominate in
criminal RICO cases. Therefore, solutions to the problems must come
from elsewhere.
IV. THE STATUS OF RICO REFORM
Since its enactment, RICO has been a very effective tool for law
enforcement. Neither Congress nor the Justice Department wants to
jeopardize that effectiveness. Some members of Congress, however, do
not share the ostrich-like view apparently taken by the Justice Depart-
ment that the mere suggestion of changing criminal RICO is an act of
heresy. Nonetheless, criminal RICO may be politically immune from
major change.
In its first ten years, RICO was used sparingly in criminal cases and
hardly at all in civil cases. Only in the last eight years has the United
States Supreme Court made definitive interpretations of RICO's broad
language. For example, from 1970 through 1985 there were only 300
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
13. Id. § 1343.
14. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (pt. 1), 18 DuQ. L. REv. 771, 771 (1980) (foot-
notes omitted).
15. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500.
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civil RICO decisions,16 and the Department of Justice prosecuted fewer
than 300 criminal RICO cases from 1970 to 1980.17
A. Criminal RICO
In the criminal area the pace has increased to a current average of
about 100 to 125 cases a year. Although I perceive some problems in the
criminal area, particularly in the area of forfeiture, Congress largely be-
lieves that the Department of Justice has been restrained and responsi-
ble in its use of this very broad and powerful statute.
An example of this circumspection was demonstrated recently
when the media gave considerable attention to Justice Department
memoranda regarding pretrial temporary restraining orders in RICO
cases,18 and the use of RICO in tax cases generally.19 These orders, con-
tained in changes to the United States Attorneys' Manual known as the
"Blue Sheet," detail policies that United States Attorneys must follow
when seeking temporary restraining orders in RICO cases and contain
extensive ground rules that must be complied with before criminal
prosecutions can be initiated. For example, under the most recent
"Blue Sheet," prior to seeking a temporary restraining order, the
United States Attorney must: (1) show that less-intrusive remedies,
such as bonds, are not likely to preserve the assets for forfeiture in the
event of a conviction; (2) articulate any anticipated impact that forfei-
ture and the temporary restraining order would have on innocent third
parties, balanced against the government's need to preserve the assets;
(3) consider the nature and severity of the offense and whether forfei-
ture would be disproportionate to the defendant's crime; and (4) not
seek to vitiate legitimate business transactions occurring between the
defendant and third parties. 0
This type of prosecutorial restraint emanating from the Depart-
ment of Justice leads me to believe that extensive change in the crimi-
nal area will not be on the agenda for RICO reform in this Congress.
Internal rules such as the temporary restraining order procedures create
a large expanse between the reach of criminal RICO as written and its
reach as applied. These salutary steps also serve to mute opposition to
16. A.B.A. SECTION OF CORP., BANKING & BUSINESS LAW, REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL RICO
TASK FORCE 55 (1985) [hereinafter ABA RICO REPORT].
17. Conversation with Paul Coffey, Deputy Chief, Organized Crime and Racketeering Sec-
tion, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice (Sept. 21, 1989).
18. Edward G. Dennis, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Pretrial Temporary
Restraining Order Memorandum (June 30, 1989) [hereinafter Dennis Memorandum].
19. Shirley D. Peterson, Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division, Tax Memorandum (July
14, 1989).
20. Dennis Memorandum, supra note 18.
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criminal RICO and undercut any support for changing it. While I ap-
plaud Justice's restraint, my preference is that this type of restraint
should be built into the statute itself.
B. Civil RICO
The RICO law also provides for a private civil action for "[a]ny
person injured in his business or property." 21 Moreover, a successful
plaintiff "shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost
of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."'22 It is in this area
that the greatest problem exists, although the extent of the problem is
in dispute. Between 1970 and 1985, only 300 civil RICO cases were
filed.23 However, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
indicates that there were 614 filings in 1986, 1095 cases in 1987, and 957
cases in 1988.24 Despite this dramatic increase, these cases still consti-
tute only a small fraction of the total number of federal civil cases filed
each year. Of the 855 civil RICO cases closed in 1988, 389 were dis-
missed and 186 settled; only fourteen went to jury trial, and only eight
were tried by a court.2" Statistics in this area, however, may be mislead-
ing because of the manner in which the Administrative Office collects
its data. Some knowledgeable parties believe that civil RICO-related
cases may be as high as ten times these figures.
Numbers alone, however, do not reflect the effect of the infusion of
these complex cases into the federal system, nor the impact of the mere
filing of such a case against a defendant. This latter situation was
brought to the Subcommittee on Crime's attention by the testimony of
a West Virginia banker who had "won" two RICO cases against his
small bank; but had been damaged severely by the suits.2"
Also, the Judicial Conference of the United States has called twice
upon Congress to reform the civil provisions of RICO. Chief Justice
William Rehnquist recently reiterated the need for reform of the stat-
ute by stating:
Virtually everyone who has addressed the question agrees that civil RICO is
now being used in ways that Congress never intended when it enacted the statute
in 1970. Most of the civil suits filed under the statute have nothing to do with
21. RICO, supra note 2, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
22. Id.
23. ABA RICO REPORT, supra note 16, at 55.
24. Hearings on H.R. 1046 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 101st Cong., lst.Sess. (1989) (hearings not officially printed as of current date) [hereinafter
RICO Hearings] (statement of Robert L. Chiesa on behalf of the American Bar Association).
25. Letter from L. Ralph Mecham, Director, Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, to the Honorable William J. Hughes, Chair, House Subcommittee on Crime (June 9, 1989).




organized crime. They are garden-variety civil fraud cases of the type traditionally
litigated in state courts.
2 7
Justice Anthony Kennedy noted, while still sitting on the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, the breadth that mail and wire fraud brings
to RICO. He observed that on the civil side, there is no prosecutorial
discretion to hold the statute in check.28 Justice Thurgood Marshall
made the same observation in even stronger terms in his dissenting
opinion in the Sedima case. Justice Marshall concluded that RICO
"stretches the mail and wire fraud statutes to their absolute limits."29
Even Justice Byron White in his majority opinion in Sedima stated,
"We nonetheless recognize that, in its private civil version, RICO is
evolving into something quite different from the original conception of
its enactors."30 Justice White also invited Congress to act when he
stated, "Yet this defect-if defect it is-is inherent in the statute as
written, and its correction must lie with Congress." 3' The Sedima case
itself identifies the problem in civil RICO. Sedima was essentially a
commercial dispute, and nothing in its facts would seem to merit spe-
cial federal jurisdiction much less the extraordinary remedy of RICO.
Numerous hearings in Congress over the last four years, including
three in the Subcommittee on Crime this year, demonstrate that a
problem exists with civil RICO. In the 99th Congress, a civil RICO re-
form bill sponsored by Representative Rick Boucher passed the House
of Representatives by a vote of 371 to 28.32 A similar bill was rejected
by a narrow margin by the Senate as an amendment to the continuing
resolution." In the 100th Congress another bill, Senate Bill 1523,"' was
27. Rehnquist, Reforming Diversity Jurisdiction and Civil RICO, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 5, 9
(1989) (originally presented at the Brookings Institution's Eleventh Seminar on the Administra-
tion of Justice, Apr. 7, 1989).
28. See Schreiber Distrib. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1402 (9th Cir. 1986).
29. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 504 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Marshall concluded further:
In the context of civil RICO, however, the restraining influence of prosecutors is com-
pletely absent. Unlike the Government, private litigants have no reason to avoid displacing
state common-law remedies. Quite to the contrary, such litigants, lured by the prospect of
treble damages and attorney's fees, have a strong incentive to invoke RICO's provisions when-
ever they can allege in good faith two instances of mail or wire fraud. Then the defendant,
facing a tremendous financial exposure in addition to the threat of being labeled a "racket-
eer," will have a strong interest in settling the dispute. The civil RICO provision consequently
stretches the mail and wire fraud statutes to their absolute limits and federalizes important
areas of civil litigation that until now were solely within the domain of the States.
Id. (citation omitted).
30. Id. at 500.
31. Id. at 499.
32. H.R. 5445, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REc. H9377 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986).
33. The substance of H.R. 5445, as an amendment, was defeated on a motion to table by a
vote of 47-44 on Oct. 16, 1986.
34. S. 1523, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
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reported favorably by the Senate Judiciary Committee, but neither this
bill nor the Boucher bill ever came to a floor vote.
Most of the legislative attention in this Congress has been on the
companion bills, House Bill 104631 and Senate Bill 438,36 introduced on
February 22, 1989. The House Subcommittee on Crime has held three
hearings on House Bill 1046; the Senate Judiciary Committee has held
one hearing on Senate Bill 438 and presently has a markup of the Bill
scheduled early next session. I also hope to move legislation in my Sub-
committee early next year.
As I indicated earlier in my remarks, these bills would add twenty-
five new predicates, but otherwise would leave criminal RICO un-
changed. They also would leave unchanged civil RICO in the hands of
most governmental litigants. Under these bills, most private civil RICO
actions would be detrebled. Some litigants, such as certain units of local
government would be entitled to treble damages, but persons injured by
insider trading, and various consumer litigants, would be entitled to
discretionary punitive damages. The remainder would be relegated to
actual damages. These bills also create an affirmative defense for de-
fendants acting in good faith reliance on official regulatory action. Fi-
nally, in one of the most controversial provisions, in many cases these
changes would be retroactive and applicable to cases already pending in
federal courts. That, in a nutshell, is the status of RICO reform today.
V. RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS
There are basically three major options to the question of what di-
rection reform should take. First, we could reform the basic criminal
law as Professor Gerard E. Lynch suggested to the Subcommittee on
Crime in early spring.37 Frankly, I would be inclined to take that task
on, but as I have said, I do not believe there is sufficient support in
Congress to accomplish it. Second, we could make civil RICO unavaila-
ble or unattractive for numerous categories of offenses covered by civil
RICO. This is essentially the approach of House Bill 1046 and Senate
Bill 438, which drastically curtail civil RICO by detrebling and disal-
lowing attorney's fees from most private, some governmental litigants,
and for most commercial transactions and consumer suits. Third, we
could tighten up both criminal and civil RICO, and make changes to
civil RICO that attempt to emulate the results attained by
prosecutorial discretion in the criminal area. I have been working
closely with the ranking Republican on our Subcommittee, Representa-
35. See H.R. 1046, supra note 8.
36. See S. 438, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. S1642 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1989).
37. H.R. 1046 Hearings, supra note 24 (testimony of Prof. Gerard E. Lynch).
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tive Bill McCollum, and Representative Boucher to develop legislation
that takes this latter approach. Representative Boucher has made
RICO reform one of his top priorities for the past two Congresses. He is
a bright and accomplished attorney who has contributed greatly to
identifying the problems in RICO, and to formulating legislative im-
provements. Representative McCollum also has taken on a substantial
share of the burden of hammering out the best legislation we can fash-
ion to correct some of the ills of RICO.
The highlights of the bill we are now working on include the follow-
ing provisions. We recommend tightening up the "pattern of racketeer-
ing" requirement and codifying the concept of continuity as articulated
by the majority in the recent Supreme Court case H.J. Inc. v. North-
western Bell Telephone Co.3 8 This new definition would adopt from
H.J. Inc. a requirement that the two or more acts of racketeering re-
quired under the statute to form a "pattern of racketeering" must be
related to one another or to a common external organizing principle.39
This new definition also would eliminate RICO coverage of cases in
which there is really only one act of fraud, but the fraud is carried out
by a series of phone calls, letters, or similar activity. This would codify
the decision in Lipin Enterprises v. Lee40 and is consistent with the
present Department of Justice guidelines.
Second, the new bill would require particularity in pleading in
every RICO case. This provision is an expansion of the present Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which require particularity only in fraud
cases.
41
Third, the bill will contain a judicial "gatekeeper" provision. One
category of cases that are entitled automatically to pass through the
gate are those in which the civil RICO conduct alleged has been the
subject of a criminal conviction. The gatekeeper provision then will ex-
press the intent of Congress that civil RICO is an "extraordinary civil
remedy" and that commercial disputes in which fraud is alleged and
other controversies involving ordinary criminal conduct should not be
filed as civil RICO cases and shall be dismissed if plaintiffs persist in
filing them. It will state that only cases involving egregious criminal
conduct may be brought, and the court is to dismiss even these cases,
unless there is a determination that the civil suit serves a public
38. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2902 (1989) (suggesting that
the "continuity" standard could eliminate many cases, because "[p]redicate acts extending over
[only] a few weeks or months and threatening no future criminal conduct do not satisfy this
requirement").
39. Id. at 2900.
40. 803 F.2d 322, 324 (7th Cir. 1986).




The Bill then provides for a hearing by the court either on its own
motion or on motion by the defendant. The court is instructed further
that only those cases in which (1) the remedy is appropriate because of
the significance of the loss to plaintiff; (2) the defendant's conduct was
central to the harm; and (3) the remedy is needed to deter criminal
conduct, should be permitted to go forward.
Our rationale is simple. We believe it is clear from the legislative
history of RICO that the primary purpose for allowing private civil
suits under RICO was to promote the public interest by allowing for
"private attorneys general" suits. It was based on the premise that
these civil suits would supplement governmental action and would at-
tack real criminal conduct, not just contract disputes written to sound
like crimes. These cases, therefore, should be the kind that the Justice
Department would bring as criminal cases, but does not for reasons of
resources or otherwise. In terms of promoting the public interest, these
civil litigants, in effect, would be serving as surrogates of the Justice
Department. The thrust of this approach is to rein in civil RICO, so
that it serves these purposes. Routine fraud allegations, which are often
nothing more than contract disputes, would be weeded out. In this pro-
cess the judge is directed to throw out all cases that do not meet the
stricter limits for civil RICO cases expressed by Congress. The amended
provisipns would emphasize that civil RICO is an "extraordinary civil
remedy," and would call upon judges to exercise discretion analogous to
the granting of injunctive relief,42 or the exercise of pendent jurisdic-
tion43 or ruling on forum nonconveniens cases.44
We would not eliminate treble damages, because treble damages
are not the problem. Indeed, treble damages are a traditional and ap-
propriate ingredient, perhaps even a necessary one, in a system
designed to encourage private attorneys general suits that are in the
public interest. The Bill also will specifically authorize the court to
award costs for violations of rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.45 Finally, we would clarify that RICO is not available as a remedy
in nonviolent free speech and assembly situations.
I believe that this approach is a sound basis for curbing most of the
abuses of RICO while at the same time maintaining civil RICO as a
42. See generally 7 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & K. SINCLAIR, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 65.04
(2d ed. 1989); 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2942-2948 (1973).
43. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). See generally 13B C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3567.1 (2d ed. 1984).
44. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947). See generally 15 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3828 (2d ed. 1986).
45. See FED. R. CIv. P. 11.
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useful tool to combat and deter criminal activity. I also believe that the
guidance contained in this Bill and the legislative history will provide a
legal framework to limit civil RICO to appropriate major criminal
activity.

